In this study we investigated the category specificity of the comprehension impairments of Y.O.T., a patient with a severe global dysphasia. Using matching to sample techniques it was possible to demonstrate selective impairments and selective preservations not only of broad categories of semantic knowledge but also of particular subsets of such categories. Specifically, Y.O.T.'s comprehension of 'objects' was , in general, significantly more impaired than for foods or living things. Within the broad class of objects she was significantly more impaired in the comprehension of small manipulable objects than large man-made objects. Within her proper noun vocabulary there was a significant dissociation between her good comprehension of proper nouns having a unique and well-known referent (e.g., Churchill) and common proper nouns without such a referent (e.g., Jones). Her error responses were not consistent, semantic similarity and significant rate effects were observed, and it was therefore considered that her category specific comprehension deficits were primarily ones of access to a full semantic representation.
INTRODUCTION
Since the midnineteenth century there have been sporadic reports of comprehension deficits in aphasic patients that are consistent with the view that knowledge systems are categorical in their organization. More recently these early anecdotal accounts have been substantiated in a series of investigations using quantitative methods, and highly selective dissociations between different classes of knowledge have now been documented.
The possibility that such classical clinical neurological dissociations could be interpreted in terms of a category specific model of semantic processing was first discussed in the context of impairment of concrete word knowledge as compared Correspondence to: Professor E. K. Warrington, National Hospital, Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG. 'Present address: Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB.
with the preservation of abstract word knowledge. This dissociation was documented in a patient whose other language and intellectual skills were well preserved (Warrington, 1975) . This selective impairment of the concrete word vocabulary has now been confirmed in a second case (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) . It is apparent, however, that fractionations may occur within the broad category of concrete words both in word retrieval and word comprehension.
In a study of naming and comprehension in aphasic patients, Goodglass et al. (1966) reported a double dissociation between two classes of concrete or imageable words, that is, the naming and comprehension of action names and object names (see also Miceli et al., 1984) . More recently we have described a patient whose naming and comprehension vocabulary for action verbs was gravely depleted. At the same time his knowledge of common nouns and proper nouns was well preserved. In particular, his ability to name famous people and geographical places was excellent (McCarthy and Warrington, 1985) . There is evidence that the class of proper nouns itself fractionates; the selective preservation of the retrieval of place names together with the selective impairment of the names of famous personalities is on record (McKenna and Warrington, 1980) . Typically, and for good practical reasons, language skills of aphasic patients are frequently assessed clinically by asking them to name or point to small manipulable objects or parts of the body. Perhaps this accounts for the early discovery of the classical syndrome autotopagnosia! These categories may be quite inadequate to describe an individual's concrete word vocabulary and indeed the observations of Nielson (1958) bear this out. He reviewed the clinical literature and claimed that there was a selective loss of knowledge of living things in 6 cases and that the knowledge of man-made objects was selectively impaired in 9 cases. These observations were interpreted in terms of a distinction between knowledge of animate and inanimate categories.
In a quantitative study of 4 patients (all recovering from Herpes simplex encephalitis), selective preservation of the comprehension of specific object knowledge was recorded (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) . The language skills of 2 of these patients (JBR and SBY) was sufficiently intact for word definition tasks to be employed. In contrast to their adequate object knowledge they were severely impaired in their ability to define animal, plant and food names. There was a similar pattern of performance in their identification of pictures. The other 2 patients (KB and ING) whose expressive language skills were severely impaired, were tested using spoken word to picture-array matching tasks; for both of these patients there was a disproportionately high error rate with the food and the animal arrays as compared with arrays of common objects.
Any suggestion that these dissociations could be accounted for in terms of, for example, word frequency,, age of acquisition, or familiarity can be discounted almost entirely on the basis of our earlier documentation of the opposite pattern of impairment in a single case, VER (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983) . Using verbal/visual matching tasks it was shown that the category 'objects' was dis-proportionately impaired in comparison with the other 3 categories which were sampled (food, animals and flowers). These data therefore provide evidence of a double dissociation between knowledge of objects on the one hand and living things and food on the other.
We have previously argued for a refinement of the animate/inanimate dichotomy and suggested that a distinction cast in terms of the relevant salience of processing functional/physical (also termed sensory) attributes might account for these dissociations. Thus similar items from the broad category of objects are primarily comprehended in terms of their core functional significance, physical attributes being of less importance for their differentiation (e.g., shoes and slippers, handbag and briefcase, gate and stile). Foods and living things by contrast are differentiated primarily in terms of their physical attributes (e.g., carrot and parsnip, canary and robin, snowdrop and crocus). This formulation is somewhat strengthened by a more detailed analysis of J.B.R.'s responses to a wide range of categories. Thus it should be noted that one animate category with strong functional significance, namely body parts, was among his preserved categories, two inanimate categories whose exemplars are differentiated mainly by their physical attributes were among the impaired categories (precious stones and fabrics). While this dichotomy has a certain plausibility, it is almost certainly an over-simplification. It would appear that this typology is at the same time too broad and too narrow. First, there is some evidence that points towards the possibility of fractionation within the categories objects and foods themselves. For example, Yamadori and Albert (1973) described a patient who appeared to have more difficulty with comprehending the names of 'indoor' objects, the knowledge of large outdoor object names being preserved. Hart et al. (1985) described a patient with a highly specific nominal dysphasia for common fruits and vegetables (comprehension of these names was stated to be intact). Secondly, it is obvious that the physical/functional dichotomy does not come close to encompassing the entire range of concrete or imageable concepts. What about action verbs, names of people, places, and so on?
We have recently had the opportunity to investigate a patient who showed an identical pattern of category specificity as our previous case, V.E.R. (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983) , namely the preservation of animals, foods and flower names. Our aim was to explore the limits of Y.O.T.'s residual comprehension skills using a wide range of stimuli. This enabled us both to investigate the possibility of further fractionations within the broad category of 'objects' and also to explore some categories not encompassed by the physical/functional dichotomy. First we report evidence for a selective impairment in the comprehension of common manipulable objects compared with large 'outdoor' objects and secondly, the remarkable preservation of certain categories of proper noun knowledge.
CASE REPORT
Y.O.T., a 50-year-old previously healthy right-handed English woman, was admitted to the Centre Hospitalier D'Annecy, France, on 28.8.84, following the sudden onset of right-sided weakness and aphasia, at which time an episode of supraventricular tachycardia was recorded. A left carotid angiogram demonstrated occlusion of the left middle cerebral artery. Eleven days later, on 8.9.84, she was transferred to the National Hospital. On neurological examination there was a dense right hemiplegia; there was no movement in either the arm or leg and facial movements were also impaired. Sensation was considered to be impaired in the right limbs and she did not respond to stimuli in the right visual field. She was globally aphasic in so far as she was unable to speak and her verbal comprehension was severely impaired.
A CT scan showed an ill-defined area of low density in the left temporoparietal region and the left lateral ventricle was larger than the right (see fig. 1 wave inversion in the lateral chest leads which gradually resolved. The infarction was considered probably to have been the result of thromboembolism.
Y.O.T. was referred to the Psychology Department on the 27.9.84 for a more detailed assessment of her dysphasia and other cognitive skills. She was tested on most days until her discharge on 15.10.84. Although Y.O.T. was alert and cooperative she was totally unable to produce any propositional speech. Her verbal utterances were restricted to the words 'yes', 'no' and 'alright', not necessarily used appropriately. Her ability to comprehend spoken language appeared to be equally gravely impaired. Her ability to nod or shake her head appropriately in response to simple questions was unreliable. She was totally unable to name common objects, or read written words aloud. She was unable to repeat any simple sounds, words, digits or to complete common phrases.
She was unable to attempt any of the verbal tests of the WAIS. Her performance IQ was only 75 (prorated from 3 test scores: Picture Completion 6, Block Design 6, and Picture Arrangement 3 (age-scaled), respectively) which we interpret as reflecting a degree of constructional and visual interpretative difficulties. However, on the Advanced Progressive Matrices Set A she scored comfortably within the average range (7/12) (Warrington, 1984) . On the 28.9.84 she failed to reach a 'basal' level on the Peabody (Form B) scoring only 6 correct on the first 10 items and 31 correct on the first 50 items. Three days later she was retested on Form A on which she scored 43/50 on the first 50 items. Her ability to point to one of 4 primary colours (red, green, blue and yellow) was unreliable. She scored 21/32 correct with a response-stimulus interval of 15 s and her score dropped to a chance level (11/32) with a shorter response-stimulus interval of 2s.
Her ability to comprehend the written word also appeared to be gravely impaired. On a modified version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Form B) in which she was required to match the printed word to a picture, she scored 38 correct on the first 50 items. She scored 13/18 in pointing to 1 of 6 letters in an array (each presented 3 times). In an identical task using numbers she scored 18/18 correct. Her ability to match a spoken word to a written word was also impaired. For example, she was only able to score 3/18 correct in pointing to 1 of 6 common adjectives (each presented 3 times) and 2/18 correct in pointing to 1 of 6 common verbs. She scored at a similar chance level (6/20) on a similar task requiring her to point to 1 of 4 1-syllable nonsense words (each presented 5 times). Thus there is no evidence of any sparing of the phonological reading process.
In an attempt to assess the status of her visual semantics an extended version of the McCarthy and Warrington (1986) visual/visual matching test, in which the subject is required to match 2 visually dissimilar pictures of the same type of object (e.g., 2 cars, 2 brushes, etc.) was administered (see fig.  2 ). On the original 30 items (each presented 4 times in a 5-item array) her score was 83/120 which is very comparable to the performance of a patient (FRA) with a selective visual associative agnosia (McCarthy and Warnngton, 1986) . However, on one additional set, namely of animals (e.g., two very different line drawings of a horse and a cow, etc.) her visual/visual matching score was 20/20. We would argue from these results, together with her relatively poor scores on the Picture Completion and Picture Arrangement subtests of the WAIS that her comprehension of visual stimuli (with the possible exception of animals) was riot spared, albeit that her verbal comprehension appeared to be much more impaired.
Her relatively good performance on the animals version of the visual/visual matching test alerted us to the possibility that her comprehension difficulties might be category specific. In the following series of experiments our aim is to document YOTs residual comprehension capacities and to explore her knowledge using an extensive vocabulary from a wide range of verbal categories.
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS

General procedures
In this series of experiments, Y.O.T.'s residual verbal comprehension capacities were investigated using matching to sample techniques. She was asked to match each stimulus by pointing to one item of an array displayed on a desk. Each experiment was preceded by a few practice trials. The test instructions were communicated by gestures and she generally appeared to understand what was required of her quite quickly. She was tested with arrays of either 5 or 6 items in blocks of 20 or 18 trials, respectively. Thus each item was probed either 4 times or 3 times and they were presented in a pseudorandom order in each block. Although she was under no pressure to respond rapidly and self-corrections were accepted, the response-stimulus interval (RSI) was a fixed 2 s unless otherwise stated (that is a fixed interval was interpolated between Y.O.T.'s response and the presentation of next stimulus in any block of trials). She was not given knowledge of results. In the first 2 experiments we report a replication of our previous observations in a patient (V.E.R.) with a category specific dysphasia in whom the verbal knowledge of common objects appeared to be selectively impaired (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983) . Five further experiments describe our exploration and documentation of a wider range of categories using both pictorial and written stimulus arrays.
Experiment I. Category specificity: flowers, animals, objects
In our previous case of semantic access dysphasia it had been observed that the category 'objects' was impaired as compared with flowers and animals in a twochoice word-picture matching test. Our aim in this experiment was to establish whether this same dissociation could be replicated with a larger pool of stimulus items.
Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of three arrays of 5 flower pictures, of 5 animal pictures and of 5 object pictures {see Appendix). The three stimulus categories were tested in a Latin square design using the same set of stimulus items for each array. •Percentage correct score on a spoken word/picture-matching test (animals, flowers, objects).
Results (1.10.84).
The percentage correct score for each category is given in Table  1 . There was a significant overall effect of category (x 2 , df2, = 9.95, P<0.01). Comment. This result replicates our original observations in V.E.R. of impaired performance with the category of 'objects' as compared with flowers and animals. A larger set of stimulus items has been sampled (and for the flower category this necessitated using relatively low frequency items); nevertheless her level of performance was very satisfactory. These results strengthen the case for the dissociation of knowledge of common objects and living things.
Experiment 2. Category specificity: foods, animals, objects
The ability to point to a picture of a named food or animal was reported to be significantly worse than the ability to point to a named object in 3 patients recovering from herpes encephalitis (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) . In this experiment our aim was not only to establish whether food was a preserved category for Y.O.T. as was the case for V.E.R. but also to establish whether Y.O.T., like V.E.R., was also sensitive to the duration of the RSI. 
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•Percentage conecl on spoken word/piclure-matching test for each category and at each Response-Stimulus Interval (RSI).
Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of three different picture arrays of 5 foods, 5 animals and 5 objects (see Appendix). The three stimulus categories were tested in a Latin square design using our standard 2 s RSI. Later on the same day this procedure was repeated using a slower 5 s interval.
Results (29.9.84) . The percentage correct score for each category for each RSI is given in Table 2 . There was a significant effect of category at the faster RSI, which is entirely attributable to her relatively impaired performance on the object category (X 2 , df2, = 18.3, P< 0.001). There was no category effect whatsoever with the slower RSI. The difference in her overall level of performance on the two occasions is entirely due to an increased score on the object category at the slower rate.
Comment. In this experiment we have confirmed our previous observations in our patient, V.E.R., in so far as preservation of the food category has also been established in the context of a selective impairment in the object category. These findings contrasted with those of the cases with herpes encephalitis (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) provide strong evidence for a double dissociation between knowledge of objects on the one hand and knowledge of food and animals on the other. Not only is Y.O.T. similar to V.E.R. in showing a category effect, but she also shows a rate effect. From this we would infer that Y.O.T., like V.E.R., has difficulty in accessing semantic information rather than in the absolute loss or degradation of the semantic representation per se. This finding will be discussed in greater detail below.
Experiment 3. Category specificity: foods, manipulable objects and large man-made objects Our aim in this experiment was to explore a major functional subdivision within the broad category 'objects'. Clinical observation suggested that Y.O.T. had particular difficulties in comprehending small manipulable objects as compared with large man-made objects. In this experiment we report our attempt to quantify this observation.
Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of three different picture arrays of 5 small manipulable objects, 5 large man-made objects, and 5 foods (see Appendix). The latter condition, using one of her preserved categories, was included as a baseline and for comparison with the two object conditions. The three stimulus categories were tested in a Latin square design.
Results (1.10.84) . The percentage correct score for each of the three categories is given in Table 3 . There was a significant overall effect of category which is attributable to her relatively impaired performance on the small manipulable object category Or, df2, = 210.7, P<0.0\). Comment. Within the broad category of objects we have demonstrated significantly different levels of performance: one subclass that we have designated 'manipulable' objects is impaired as contrasted with the relative preservation of the subclass we have termed 'large man-made'. Y.O.T.'s comprehension of the latter category is at an equivalent level to that of foods, one of her categories of preserved comprehension. We will discuss the more theoretical implications of these observations below.
Experiment 4. Fine-grain category specificity using an auditory I printed word matching task
We have established {see above) that Y.O.T. was a phonological dyslexic with some preservation of printed word to picture matching. In this experiment we explore her ability to match a spoken-word to an array of written words. Using this technique enabled us to investigate a wide range of vocabulary without the constraints imposed by the limitations of pictorial material. Our aim in this experiment was to obtain evidence for a more fine-grained categorical organization of knowledge systems. We selected 16 diverse categories to include subcategories of objects, subcategories of foods and in addition a number of categories we had not previously tested.
Procedure. The test stimuli were selected from each of 16 Battig and Montague categories and consisted of two different 6-item arrays of printed words {see Appendix). Y.O.T. was required to match a spoken word to one of the 6 written words of the array. One array from each category was tested on 5.10.84 and the other array for each category on 6.10.84 in the order indicated in Table 4 . Results (5 and 6.10.84). The percentage correct for each category on each occasion, together with the total percentage correct, is given in Table 4 . The correlation (Spearman) between her scores for the two arrays of stimuli was 0.6 (P<0.05). Apart from the two categories on which she scored at an overall chance level (furniture and parts of the body), there was a clutch of categories for which her performance, although not error-free, was remarkably satisfactory (namely, animals, occupations, vegetables and materials) and a further group on which her scores were at an intermediary level (e.g., colours, geographical features, kitchen utensils). There was an overall significant effect of category (j 2 , dfl5, = 108.7, /»< 0.001).
Comment. First, we have obtained evidence for category specific impairment and preservation using a spoken-word to written-word matching test. We would argue that these are reliable findings in so far as we replicated our first set of observations using a parallel set of test stimuli on a subsequent test session even though this necessitated using relatively low frequency words in some categories (e.g., flowers). Secondly, in general we have corroborated the broad category effects obtained in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 (with possibly two exceptions). Thirdly, we have probed a wider range of categories, some of which are not obviously a subset of either manmade objects or living things and foods. In these categories we have also obtained evidence of fractionation: thus her comprehension of occupations was remarkably preserved, whereas her comprehension of geographical features was by comparison weak.
Experiment 5. Category specificity: proper nouns (8.10.84)
In Experiment 4 we established that a spoken word to printed-word matching task produced replicable fine-grained category effects. Our aim in this experiment was to assess Y.O.T.'s comprehension of a number of verbal categories not hitherto investigated in order to obtain a reasonably comprehensive picture of her residual verbal vocabulary. Thus we assessed her proper noun vocabulary. The categories included were countries, cities and names of famous people (proper nouns with a unique referent) and familiar Christian and surnames (proper nouns without a high probability unique referent). In addition some abstract word categories were tested and some further subcategories of objects that were not included in Experiment 4. Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of 6-item arrays from each of 12 categories {see Appendix). Each category was tested in the order indicated in Table 5 , using blocks of 18 trials for each category.
Results (8.10.84). The proportion correct for each category is given in Table 5 .
There is an overall significant effect of category Of 2 , dfll, = 65.3, / > <0.001). The most striking finding is the remarkable preservation of her comprehension for the names of famous people and geographical place names as compared with the comprehension of familiar Christian names and surnames for which her performance was no better than chance. Her comprehension of academic subjects was also at a chance level and her comprehension of the other abstract categories was at an intermediate level. Had it been possible to match word frequency familiarity for the items in the 'intermediate' categories, a more clear-cut result might have been observed. Of the other categories probed it is worth noting that her comprehension of parts of the house and musical instruments, a subclass of small manmade objects, was impaired.
Comment. First, her comprehension of proper nouns with a high probability unique referent was preserved and contrasts with her very poor comprehension of familiar proper nouns without a unique referent. The dissociation was clear-cut and occurred for three subclasses of each of these two types of proper nouns. This pattern of dissociation has not to our knowledge been observed previously and will be discussed below. Her comprehension of academic subjects was extremely poor and contrasts with what would appear to be a not dissimilar category, namely sports. Secondly, for Y.O.T. it appears as though her residual abstract word vocabulary is at an intermediate level and this case is therefore neutral with regard to the abstract/concrete dichotomy.
Experiment 6a. Effects of semantic similarity using spoken-word/picture matching
Our aim in this experiment was to explore the effect of semantic similarity between items in an array for Y.O.T.'s residual comprehension abilities, since we have previously reported the importance of such effects using matching to sample paradigms. Five subsets were selected from the broad 'object' category, a category we have already established was poorly comprehended. In addition the impaired category, parts of the body, was included. For comparison we probed semantic similarity effects within five subsets from her preserved categories (i.e., countries, famous people, famous buildings, occupations and transport) and one additional category, namely geographical features.
Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of arrays of 6 pictures from each of six of her impaired subsets and six of her preserved subsets. Each of the two sets of 36 stimulus items were tested under conditions of 'close' and 'distant' semantic similarity. In the 'close' semantic condition all 6 items of the array were from the same impaired subset (e.g., book, key, pen, pencil, envelope, telephone) or from one of the same spared subset (e.g., famous people) (see Table 6 ). In the 'distant' semantic condition the arrays consisted of 1 item from each of the six 'impaired' (e.g., pencil, chair, door, foot, hat, pen) or six 'preserved' categories (India, Napoleon, cliff, Parthenon, train and dentist) (see Appendix). Y.O.T. was tested in blocks of 18 trials for each array. The order of presentation of the four types was: (1) Results (10.10.84) . The percentage correct for each category for each semantic similarity condition is given in Table 6 . Her performance is at ceiling on those categories previously shown to be preserved and therefore the effect of semantic similarity could not be examined. There is a highly significant effect of semantic similarity within the impaired category sets (binomial x = 0, P = 0.02). It is worth noting that her worst performance in both the 'close' and 'distant' conditions was for parts of the body, the category most dissimilar to the other five selected impaired categories! Comment. First, we have replicated and extended our previous documentation of semantic similarity effects. Secondly, it is clear that her performance on her preserved and impaired subsets is in excellent accord with the results obtained in Experiment 4 although a different set of items was tested. In addition, a previously untested subclass of referential proper nouns, famous buildings and monuments was included and her performance was error-free even in the 'close' semantic condition. The significance of the effect of semantic similarity within the impaired subsets will be discussed below.
Experiment 6b. Effects of semantic similarity using written-word/'picture matching
In the previous experiment we used a spoken-word to picture matching task to examine semantic similarity effects. In this experiment our aim was to replicate the 'close' and 'distant' effects within Y.O.T.'s impaired subsets, using a written word to picture matching task.
Procedure. The test stimuli consisted of the same six arrays of pictures that were used in Experiment 6 to probe her comprehension of the impaired subsets and a written-word stimulus was substituted for the spoken word in the matching task. The close and distant conditions were identical to those in Experiment 6, and the 12 blocks were tested using an ABBA design with respect to the 'close' and 'distant' conditions.
Results. The percentage correct for each category for each condition are given in Table 7 . With one exception, her performance is above chance for all the categories in the 'close' condition (parts of the house). In the 'distant' condition her performance on each category tested was superior to when tested in the close condition. The difference in her overall level of performance between the close and distant conditions is significant (binomial x = 0, P = 0.02). Comment. Her overall level of performance on this test is very comparable to that observed when the arrays were tested using the spoken-word to picture matching. Significant effects of semantic similarity have again been obtained. With the exception of the parts of the body category all the stimulus items could be subsumed within the class of man-made objects. Yet within and between the subsets very clear semantic similarity effects have been obtained. We would argue that superordinate knowledge of these subcategories could not account entirely for these findings and we will consider below an alternative account in terms of refractoriness within the semantic system.
General analysis
Consistency analysis. The overall proportion of correct responses for each category or condition tested could have arisen due to consistent responding (either consistently correct or consistently incorrect) to particular items. Alternatively her incorrect response could be randomly distributed taking into account her overall error rate. The sets of data from Experiments 2 and 3 on which her scores were neither at floor or at ceiling (i.e., N(p) and N(q)> 1) were analysed for response consistency using the binomial dispersion test (Wetherill, 1972) . This is sensitive to those instances on which her performance on individual items was either consistently good or bad. In both instances her performance conformed very closely to the binomial distribution (x 2 , dfl4, = 12.6, P>0.5; y 2 , dfl4, = 9.56, P>0.1, respectively) indicating significant variability rather than consistency in her performance on individual items. Serial trial analysis. In Experiments 2 and 3, each of 45 stimulus items was probed 4 times. Comparing Y.O.T.'s first response to an item with her second response to the same item, there was a significant decrement in her performance in both experiments such that her second response was likely to be less accurate than her first (binomial test, n=13, x = 2, /> = 0.01 and n=10, x=l, P = 0.01, respectively). In Experiment 4 in which each of 196 stimuli were probed 3 times, there was again a significant decrement between her first and second response to individual items (n = 66, x = 22, P = 0.005). In Experiment 5 in which 72 items were probed 3 times, there was not a significant serial trial effect (n = 22, x= 11, P = 0.3). Finally, in Experiments 6 and 7, considering only her performance on those six categories designated 'impaired' tested in the 'close' condition, there was a significant serial trial effect in the former (n= 14, x = 2, P = 0.006) but not in the latter (n=18, x = 7, P = 0.024). Thus in 4 of these 6 experiments (Experiment 1 was omitted from this analysis as only 15 stimulus items were probed) there is a decrement in her performance with repeated testing.
DISCUSSION
In this series of experiments we have documented the residual comprehension abilities of a patient Y.O.T. who had a severe global dysphasia such that her capacity for comprehension and production of propositional speech appeared to be virtually absent. Nevertheless, using matching to sample techniques, we were able to document islands of preserved comprehension. The main theme of these experiments has been the investigation of her comprehension of a wide range of verbal categories. Before discussing the implications of our evidence of fine-grain categorical deficits, we will consider briefly two issues: first, whether her deficit should be construed as one of 'degradation' of the semantic representation or in procedures for accessing them and secondly, the question of modality specificity.
We have characterized an access deficit in terms of inconsistency in the availability of a particular representation over time. It differs from a degradation deficit in which the central representation itself appears to be damaged, and in these cases response consistency may be observed (Coughlan and Warrington, 1981) . Y.O.T., like our previous patient V.E.R., whom we identified as a semantic access dysphasic, showed inconsistent performance on items within categories for which her overall performance was significantly above chance. More crucially she showed clear-cut rate effects in that the respose-stimulus interval (RSI) was a significant determinant of her performance. In addition, as with V.E.R., effects of serial position were obtained within her impaired categories, thus her performance deteriorated between the first and second presentation of an item. Her inconsistency could therefore not be accounted for in terms of any simple 'random walk' through a set of generally or specifically degraded semantic representations. We would therefore classify Y.O.T.'s comprehension deficit as being due to an inability to access central semantic representations of concepts.
We have previously advanced the concept of 'refractoriness' to account for this constellation of deficits and in particular the observation that an access deficit could also be category specific. As with V.E.R., we would suggest that Y.O.T.'s semantic knowledge base was liable to become refractory following activation. In this regard the semantic distance effects are consistent with a gradient of spreading refractoriness. Indeed our present data provide stronger evidence that these deleterious effects of activation affect not only the processing of a single semantic representation but extend to those that are semantically related. Thus under conditions where knowledge of the superordinate concept would be of no obvious benefit, we still obtained clear effects of semantic distance. Her performance on arrays of closely related items (but note these were neither perceptually nor semantically confusable) was very significantly impaired. This contrasted with her superior ability to recognize the same items when they were probed in semantically distant arrays.
Whether in this instance a particular set of 'close' semantic entries became refractory or whether it was the particular procedures required to access such representations that became refractory remains an open question. Such possibilities are not exhaustive, neither are they mutually exclusive and indeed in some formulations might be considered as identical. Semantic distance effects are clearly compatible with either possibility. It is of interest to note that analagous category specific refractory effects have been reported in normal subjects (e.g., Tipper, 1985) .
It has been suggested that the semantic knowledge systems may have modality specific processing components (e.g., Warrington, 1975; Beauvois, 1982; Warrington and Shallice, 1984; McCarthy and Warrington, 1986) . The observations that the comprehension deficits within one modality are not necessarily mirrored by those in other modalities (i.e., there may be a mismatch between verbal and visual comprehension) have been adduced as evidence for this position.
Our clinical assessment established that Y.O.T. had a visual recognition deficit, a profound auditory verbal comprehension deficit and was dyslexic. It was necessary to use matching to sample techniques to investigate her residual comprehension abilities. This inevitably involves two domains of information processing and therefore precludes any viable evaluation of the relative contribution of each mode of presentation. In particular, on the basis of the evidence we have presented here it would not be appropriate to discuss the problem of the relationship between say verbal semantic knowledge and visual semantic knowledge nor between the different modes of verbal processing (e.g., comprehension of the spoken word as compared with the written word). Our discussion will be cast in very general terms since the evidence in this case is neutral with regard to the interrelationship of verbal and visual semantic processing. The possibilities include complete autonomy of each system (e.g., Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Beauvois, 1982) and temporary inter-dependence during acquisition (Clark, 1973) , through to single unitary systems (Allport and Funnell, 1981; Ratcliff and Newcombe, 1982) .
Category specificity
In each of these experiments we have obtained evidence for the relative impairment and relative preservation of the comprehension of a number of semantic categories. These included a number of categories previously investigated and in addition some which have not hitherto been explored. Similar category effects were observed on each of the three types of matching task, and the pattern of relative preservation and relative impairment was remarkably consistent across experiments. There are two major aspects of this evidence of category specificity that merit further discussion. First, does a 'physical/functional' typology account adequately for the pattern of dissociations within Y.O.T.'s residual concrete word vocabulary. Secondly, what are the implications of the fractionation within her proper noun vocabulary, for the organization of knowledge systems?
To recapitulate, we have previously argued that the identification of manmade objects crucially depends on precise functional specifications whereas for the identification of living things and food physical features provide the major defining characteristics. The physical/functional dichotomy was introduced as a refinement of the older animate/inanimate distinction in order to account for certain anomalies in the patterns of preserved and impaired comprehension observed in patients with impairments of their concrete word vocabulary. Thus, specifically, a dissociation between the animate and inanimate concepts was documented in J.B.R. (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) . However, his comprehension of fabrics, an inanimate category, was extremely poor whereas his comprehension of body parts (surely animate) was very good. Thus while the animate/inanimate distinction fails the physical/functional distinction appeared to be fairly satisfactory.
This physical/functional typology certainly provides a first approximation as an account of Y.O.T.'s pattern of preserved and impaired comprehension. The broad category effects were opposite to those of J.B.R. (and the 3 other similar cases). This replicates our previously reported dissociation in V.E.R. in that animals, plants and foods were relatively preserved compared with objects (Warrington and McCarthy, 1983) . Moreover Y.O.T.'s performance on those particular categories that first led to the introduction of a physical/functional typology, namely 'body parts' and 'fabrics' was a mirror image of J.B.R.'s. Thus her comprehension of fabric names was remarkably good whereas her comprehension of body part names was particularly bad. This latter result appears to be particularly robust in so far as it was obtained using all three types of matching task.
Nevertheless, the present data presents a number ,of problems for this physical/functional formulation. We have evidence of a fractionation within the broad category of man-made objects that would hardly be predicted within such a framework. We were alerted by the clinical description by Yamadori and Albert (1973) of a patient with particular difficulty in comprehending indoor objects as compared with outdoor objects, and tested Y.O.T. with items from these categories. We obtained evidence for a selective impairment in her comprehension of small manipulable objects, her comprehension of large 'outdoor' man-made objects being as competent as that of one of her major preserved 'physical' categories, namely foods. Further evidence for this dissociation was obtained using arrays of 'close' semantic coordinates. Thus, for example, comprehension of types of buildings and kinds of transport were relatively preserved whereas comprehension of household furniture and office equipment was impaired. On the basis of this dissociation in Y.O.T.'s performance, we would reject any simplistic account of her verbal comprehension abilities cast purely in terms of the predominance of processing either physical or functional attributes. Boats and houses, for example, are clearly comprehended in terms of their functional core properties, at least to the same extent as pencils and chairs.
Before discussing the more theoretical issues raised by these observations we shall consider briefly the implications of the other major dissociation in Y.O.T.'s comprehension vocabulary, namely the selective preservation and selective impairment within her proper name vocabulary.
We observed, first, that she was able to point to a named famous person or building in an array of pictures; secondly, that her performance was equally good with similar stimuli presented in a written array and, thirdly, she also had no difficulty in comprehending the names of countries and counties. By contrast she scored at a chance level in pointing to common surnames, boys' names and girls' names. These observations could be considered as indicative of a potential double dissociation between well-known people's names and well-known names of people, since a patient is on record who had a selective deficit in retrieving well-known people's names but no difficulty in generating boys ' and girls' names (McKenna and Warrington, 1980) .
The distinction between those proper names that are of a distinct and unique individual (e.g., Picasso) and those that do not have a high probability common referent has been anticipated on theoretical grounds (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976) . All proper names clearly have referential and pragmatic roles. However, only in the case of a high probability or well-known referent do they have an unambiguous meaning which is independent of context. Take the example 'Michael painted a ceiling' and 'Michelangelo painted a ceiling'; the meaning conveyed by the two sentences is very different. In the former case the proper name fulfills a somewhat restricted generic role, in the latter the referent is quite specific. For Y.O.T. this distinction is borne out empirically at the level of the single word; Mozart and India appear to be comprehended whereas Anne and Jones are not.
Theoretical considerations
We have both replicated and extended previously described dissociations between categories of verbal knowledge. There appears to be increasing evidence for a finegrain categorical organization of knowledge systems (e.g., Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Hart et ai, 1985) . How can these multiple dissociations be incorporated into a principled account of systems achieving comprehension of meaningful stimuli? We would suggest that it may be appropriate to return to the classical concept of associative agnosia -which was first expounded in detail by Lissauer (1890) and whose ideas were in turn drawn from the English school of empiricist philosophy. The core concept for Lissauer was that meaning is acquired through the linkage of the output-of perceptual processing systems with memory 'images' laid down in the brain through other sense modalities. To illustrate his position he gives the following example of recognizing a violin.
'With the violin's image there are connected a number of recollections which concern its name, its sound, its image. The sound of the instrument, the sensations and tactile experience which go with its handling. In addition there may be the optical image of a violinist in his characteristic pose. It is only when these associations between the percept of the instrument and the above-mentioned recollections occur promptly in consciousness that one is enabled to interpret the object as a musical instrument and differentiate it from other instruments and generally to categorise it. If, however, this association is delayed or disrupted through some pathological process then even if the image of the violin is perceived, however precisely, there are no associations with prior experiences and recognition is therefore not possible. ' In this example, it is clear that Lissauer wished to emphasize the relevant contribution of various modalities of experience towards the acquisition of meaning (applied in conjunction with or following a full perceptual description). We wish to extend the associationist framework and to speculate that the relative 'importance' or 'weighting' values of different channels of sensory/motor evidence could possibly form the basis of category specificity in the brain. By 'weighting' value we mean that the information from each of the relevant channels will make a different quantitative contribution to the overall computational processes involved in the initial acquisition and resultant comprehension of meaningful stimuli. To anticipate, we shall argue that the end product of such processing is a categorically organized knowledge base.
We shall attempt to elaborate this conceptualization with reference to the differentiation of several minimal pairs. We will adopt as a working assumption that the processes involved in differentiation between two similar members of a class are a prerequisite not only for their acquisition but also for subsequent use. Consider the differentiation of 2 animals (a sheep and a goat) as compared with 2 foods (butter and cheese). In the former instance, visual information is the most important sense modality; however, in the latter, taste information would appear to be more important than visual information. The relative salience of each of the sense modalities is clearly different in these instances of categories comprehended in terms of their sensory attributes. In addition, however, the weighting values from sensory/motor channels of information may be of significance in the differentiation of 2 similar man-made objects. For example, visual information is clearly relevant for the differentiation of, say, a chair and a stool but much less so in the case of a shirt and a jacket. Of course, knowledge of function itself may be a product of a more abstract or more schematized representations based (at least during acquisition) on sensory/motor information.
So far this account is merely a development of the earlier broad class distinction between the predominance of physical or functional attributes for the comprehension of meaning. However, we wish to argue that this framework can be elaborated to account for fine-grain categorical dissociations. These may arise not only as a consequence of differing weighting values between information from each of the major sensory/motor modalities, but also as a consequence of different weighting values on more specialized channels within each modality. It is becoming clear that for each of the major modalities there is differentiation into a number of components. To take the example of visual functions, colour, shape, motion and location are known to be separable both physiologically, anatomically and psychologically at very early stages of information processing (e.g., Zeki, 1980; Duncan, 1984; Livingstone and Hubel, 1984) . It seems not implausible to suggest that this early segregation may have concomitants for later stages of cognitive analysis and that the evidence provided by or derived from such functions (i.e., channels), may interact differentially with information from other sources.
Consider first the recently reported selective impairment in naming fruit and vegetables, surely an example of fine-grain categorical dissociation. The differentiation of two vegetables (e.g., cabbage and cauliflower) or two fruits (e.g. blackberry and raspberry) can be compared with the differentiation of a closely related category, namely 2 flowers (e.g., a tulip and a carnation). In the former instance, visual information clearly has a high weighting. In addition, within the visual channels, colour rather than shape, is the critical attribute. For flowers, visual information is once again the dominant sensory channel but shape rather than colour information is crucial.
Turning now to the fine-grain dissociation between small manipulable objects and large man-made objects which we have documented in Y.O.T., although both classes of object have a functional core meaning, the weightings on sensory/motor information may be very different in the two cases. The differentiation of say a key and a pen as contrasted with a plane and a helicopter require very different contributions from each of the major information channels. Visual shape information might have lower priority for the former but be highly salient for the latter. Perhaps more relevant for differentiating between man-made objects is the importance of somatosensory information and information derived from actions. For small manipulable objects the information derived from fine distal arm movements is highly salient but clearly much less so for large man-made objects. It is of some interest that this distinction within the broad class of man-made objects had been anticipated by Konorski (1967) and Gilinsky (1984) within a somewhat related theoretical framework.
Can this account of relative weighting values of different channels of sen-sory/motor evidence also be applied to those concepts which are not obviously encompassed by the broad physical/functional distinction? It is clearly compatible with the double dissociation observed between impairments of abstract and concrete verbal vocabularies. The contributions of such channels for comprehension of abstract concepts is likely to be of minor importance. Similarly, there is likely to be a high weighting value on motor channels for the comprehension of action verbs. Whether this approach, however, is equally applicable to the dissociation observed in Y.O.T.'s proper name vocabulary is more problematical. Well-known names differ from other items in the concrete word vocabulary perhaps only in that they refer to a unique and invariant concept. As with other categories within the concrete domain the relative weighting values from each of the sensory/motor channels will be salient. By contrast, well-known names of people do not refer to a unique and invariant concept. It would therefore seem likely that their semantic representation will depend on highly complex interactions between multiple information channels. The present account is intentionally a general one that deals with the initial stages of semantic analysis. These we suggest are best described in terms of strict categorical organization. At the same time we do not wish to deny that there may be other levels of cognitive procedures mediating comprehension (e.g., associative searches) that are based on other principles. It has nevertheless the advantage of systematizing some of the apparently arbitrary examples of category specificity within the concrete noun vocabulary that are observed following lesions to the brain. It is possible that the patterns of fractionation which are observed reflect the topographical or physiological organization of neural systems that are involved in knowledge processing. Indeed, on such an account, category specific deficits may be an emergent property of the acquisition of competence in such processing. Our current perspectives have much in common with contemporary computational connectionist models of knowledge processing in which representations are computed on the basis of weighted entries in parallel distributed processing systems (e.g., Hinton 1981; Ballard, 1986) . It is perhaps not overoptimistic to suggest that an approach based on such models may not only be able to provide a rational basis for category specific effects but it is possible that they may also be able to predict as yet unrecorded dissociations. 
